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Abstract
I introduce uncertainty into the model of strategic cost−reducing R and D investments and
reexamine welfare implications. I discuss two models. In one model an increase in
expenditure decreases production costs when R\Dsucceeds, and in the other model it
increases probability of success. I show that two models yield completely different
implications for tax−subsidy policies on R and D investments. In the former model
equilibrium investment level is always too low from the viewpoint of social welfare, while in
the latter model it can be either too low or too high and relatively risky (safe) investments
should be subsidized (taxed).
I am grateful to Takanori Ida, Kazuhiko Kato, Noriaki Matsushima, Tatsuhiko Nariu, Tadashi Sekiguchi,Daisuke Shimizu,
Yoshiaki Tojyo and participants of the seminars at University of Tokyo and Kyoto University for their helpful comments and
suggestions. I am also indebted to an anonymous referee and an associate editor, Professor John Wooders, for their valuable and
constructive suggestions. Needless to say, I am responsible for any remaining errors. I gratefully acknowledge financial supports
from Grant−in−Aid of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.
Citation: Matsumura, Toshihiro, (2003) "Strategic R and D investments with uncertainty." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 1
pp. 1−7
Submitted: April 1, 2003.  Accepted: June 13, 2003.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2003/volume12/EB−03L10004A.pdf1 Introduction
I reexamine welfare eﬀect of strategic cost-reducing R&D investments in oligopoly mar-
kets by introducing uncertainty of success. In contrast to a huge body of literature on
R&D competition models of patent race, quite a smaller body of literature on strategic
cost-reducing R&D deals with uncertainty. The literature with strategic R&D compe-
tition is fairly large.1 Most studies assume that R&D succeeds with probability one.
Without any doubt, most R&D investments fail with a positive probability. Thus, inves-
tigating the eﬀect of uncertainty is important.
In this paper I introduce into the model of Brander and Spencer (1983) and Lahiri and
Ono (1999) uncertainty, where R&D investments fail with a positive probability, and dis-
cuss whether or not the equilibrium investment level exceeds the eﬃcient one. I consider
two models. One is the model where an increase in investments decreases production
cost when R&D succeeds, and another is the model where an increase in investments
increases the probability of success. I ﬁnd that two models yield quite diﬀerent welfare
implications. In the former model the equilibrium investments are insuﬃcient from the
viewpoint of social welfare. In the latter model the equilibrium investments are insuﬃ-
cient (excessive) if the equilibrium probability of success is low (high). In other words,
the private incentive of R&D investments for relatively risky (safe) projects is insuﬃcient
(excessive). These results indicate that whether or not subsidies for R&D investments
improve welfare depends on whether ﬁrms spend money on increasing innovation size or
the probability of success, and on the property of the project (risky or safe).
I use a standard strategic commitment games. In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms engage in cost-
reducing R&D investments, and in the second stage they compete ` a la Cournot. A lot has
been written on such two-stage models. Recently Lahiri and Ono (1999) point out that,
very few studies analyze a question of R&D subsidies, while they are widely introduced
in many countries. They also emphasize the importance of ex ante asymmetries between
ﬁrms. In this paper I consider ex ante symmetric games. Introducing uncertainty, asym-
metries between two ﬁrms appear in the second stage with a positive probability. I show
that this ex post asymmetries are quite important for analyzing optimal R&D subsidies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 investigates the equilibrium investment level. Section 4 discusses the welfare
implication by comparing the equilibrium investment level with the socially eﬃcient one.
1 See, among others, Brander and Spencer (1983), Spence (1984), d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993), Matsumura (1995), and
Lahiri and Ono (1999). See also Martin (2000), which is a unique work discussing strategic cost-reducing
investments in the context of a patent race.
1Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
I formulate two-stage duopoly games. Two ﬁrms are symmetric before the game. In the
ﬁrst stage each ﬁrm engages in cost-reducing R&D activities. Firm i (i =1 ,2) succeeds
in reducing its cost with probability qi, independently of whether or not ﬁrm j succeeds
(j =1 ,2,j = i). Let ci denote the (constant) marginal production costs. If ﬁrm i
succeeds in cost-reducing, its marginal production cost becomes ci = c − ∆i. Otherwise,
its marginal production cost is ci = c.
I consider two games. One is the game where each ﬁrm i chooses ∆i given q1 = q2 = q.
In this game an increase in R&D expenditure decreases the production costs when it
succeeds. The other is the game where each ﬁrm i chooses qi given ∆1 =∆ 2 =∆ ( > 0).
In the second game, an increase in R&D expenditure increases the probability of the
success of R&D. Let I(∆i,q i) denote the investment costs. I assume that I(∆i,q i)i s



















so as to ensure the interior solution.
At the beginning of the second stage each ﬁrm observes its rival’s cost. Then the
duopolists produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the market demand
function is given by p = a−Y (price as a function of quantity), where Y is the total output
of duopolists. Let yi denote the output of ﬁrm i. Each ﬁrm i chooses yi independently.
3 Equilibrium
I use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as equilibrium concept. Let superscript ‘E’
denote the equilibrium outcome. In the Cournot game at the second stage, given c1 and
c2, the equilibrium output yE
i and the proﬁt πE









(a − 2ci + cj)2
9
− I(∆i,q i)( i,j =1 ,2,i  = j). (1)




[qiqj(a − c +2 ∆ i − ∆j)
2 + qi(1 − qj)(a − c +2 ∆ i)
2
2 For the suﬃcient convexity of investment cost functions, see footnotes (5) and (9).
2+( 1 − qi)qj(a − c − ∆j)
2 +( 1− qi)(1 − qj)(a − c)
2] − I(∆i,q i). (2)
First, consider the game where each ﬁrm chooses ∆i, given q1 = q2 = q. The ﬁrst
order condition is given by
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Henceforth, I restrict attentions to the symmetric equilibrium.3 Substituting ∆1 =∆ 2 =
∆ into (3) yields
4q
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Let ∆E(q) denote the equilibrium innovation size. It is derived from (4).
Next, consider the game where each ﬁrm chooses qi, given ∆1 =∆ 2 =∆ . The ﬁrst
order condition is given by
4∆
9











Let qE(∆) denote the equilibrium q. It is derived from (6).4
4 Results
In this section I discuss the following second best problem so as to compare the equi-
librium outcomes discussed in the previous section to the eﬃcient one. The welfare-
maximizing social planner chooses the action of each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst stage, given the
Cournot competition in the next stage.
3 Since the reaction curve of the ﬁrst stage game has a negative slope (i.e., strategic substitutes) and is
continuous, I can show that the symmetric equilibrium is unique. However, it is possible that asymmetric
equilibria also exist. A suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium is ∂2I/∂∆2 > 4q(2 + q)/9,
which is a more restrictive condition than the second order condition. For the discussion of asymmetric
equilibria, see Amir and Wooders (1998).
4 Since the reaction curve of the ﬁrst stage game has a negative slope (i.e., strategic substitutes) and
is continuous, the symmetric equilibrium is unique. However, it is possible that asymmetric equilibria
also exist. A suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium is ∂2I/∂q2 > 4∆2/9, which is a more
restrictive condition than the second order condition. See also footnote (3).
3First, I consider the ﬁrst game where innovation size of each ﬁrm is determined.
Suppose that the social planner chooses ∆1 =∆ 2 = ∆, given q1 = q2 = q.5 Then each
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, (7)
and social welfare (total surplus) is given by
W = CS+ π1 + π2. (8)
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2 + 4(1 − q)
2(a − c)
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+ q(1 − q)(8a
2 +8 c
2 + 11∆
2 − 16ac +8 a∆ − 8c∆)] − 2I(∆,q). (9)
The ﬁrst order condition is
q
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Let ∆∗(q) denote this eﬃcient innovation size ∆. It is derived from (10).
Proposition 1: ∆∗(q) ≥ ∆E(q) ∀q ∈ [0,1] and the equality is satisﬁed if and only if
q =0or q =1 .
Proof: The left-hand side of (10) – the left-hand side of (4) = ∆(1 − q)q/3 ≥ 0, and
the equality is satisﬁed if and only if q =0o rq =1 . Note that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. From the
convexity of I(∆), I obtain Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
The result that ∆∗(1) = ∆E(1) has already been shown by Brander and Spencer (1983).6
Proposition 1 implies that introducing uncertainty induces the deviation of the equilib-
rium innovation size from the eﬃcient one. I now discuss the intuition behind this result.
5 This assumption is not innocuous. Suppose that cost is given exogenously. Then the total proﬁts
of two ﬁrms is jointly convex in costs. Thus it is possible that the social planner prefers the asymmetric
outcome to the symmetric one. A suﬃcient condition under which the symmetric outcome is eﬃcient
is ∂2I/∂∆2 >q (11 + 7q)/9, which is a more strict condition than what appears in footnote (3). This
is a reason why we assume that ∂2I/∂∆2 is suﬃciently large. For the related works pointing out this
convexity in costs and possible eﬃcient asymmetric equilibria, see Amir and Wooders (2000) and Salant
and Shaﬀer (1998).
6 They also show that ∆∗(1) > (<)∆E(1) if p   > (<)0. I can show that uncertainty decreases ∆E
more signiﬁcantly than ∆∗, so ∆∗ can be larger than ∆E even if p   < 0, and ∆∗ is always larger than
∆E if p   > 0.
4An increase in ∆ increases ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt and aﬀects welfare when ﬁrm 1 is successful in
the project. It induces the production substitution from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1. With probabil-
ity 1−q, the cost of ﬁrm 2 is c, which is higher than c−∆i. Thus, the above production
substitution economizes the total production costs because it reduces the production of
the less eﬃcient ﬁrm and increases that of the more eﬃcient ﬁrm. Firm i chooses ∆i
without considering this welfare-improving production substitution eﬀect, so the incen-
tive for increasing the innovation size becomes insuﬃcient. This eﬀect disappears only if
1 − q = 0 (i.e., ﬁrm 2 is always as eﬃcient as ﬁrm 1).7
This result is closely related to that of Lahiri and Ono (1988). They show that a
reduction of the output of the ﬁrm with the higher marginal cost improves welfare.8 In
my model an increase in ∆ increases this welfare-improving production substitution when
ex post asymmetries appear, so it should be promoted by subsidies. My result shows that
the principle of Lahiri and Ono is important even when ﬁrms are symmetric ex ante.
Next, I consider the second game where the probability of success is determined.
Suppose that the social planner chooses q1 = q2 = q, given ∆1 =∆ 2 =∆ .9 Then each
ﬁrm faces Cournot competition discussed in the previous sections. The social planner
maximizes (9) with respect to q. The ﬁrst order condition is
∆
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Let q∗(∆) denote this eﬃcient probability of the success. It is derived from (11).
Proposition 2: q∗(∆) ≤ qE(∆) if and only if qE(∆) ≥ 1/2.
Proof: The left-hand side of (11) – the left-hand side of (6) = ∆(1−2q)/6. Since ∆ > 0,
it is non-positive if and only if q ≥ 1/2. From the convexity of I(q), I obtain Proposition
7 The essential point in this paper is ex post asymmetries rather than uncertainty. Suppose that I
drop the assumption of no-correlation and consider the following model: The probability that both ﬁrms
succeed or fail is (1+ r)/4, and the probability that only ﬁrm 1 succeeds or fails is (1−r)/4, where r is
the correlation coeﬃcient. Then I can show that ∆∗ ≥ ∆E and that the equality is satisﬁed if and only if
r =1 . Note that, if the projects of two ﬁrms are perfectly correlated, the welfare-improving production
substitution does not occur in the symmetric equilibrium. For the discussion of correlation in the context
of patent race, see Cardon and Sasaki (1998).
8 For other discussions of welfare-enhancing production substitution eﬀects, see also Brander (1981),
Ono (1990), Riordan (1998), Matsumura (1998, 2003), Lahiri and Ono (1998), Ushio (2000), and Mat-
sushima and Matsumura (2003).
9 A suﬃcient condition under which the symmetric outcome is eﬃcient is ∂2I/∂q2 > 7∆2/9, which is
a more strict condition than what appears in footnote (4). This is a reason why we assume that ∂2I/∂q2
is suﬃciently large.
52. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that the equilibrium R&D expenditure is too small from the view-
point of social welfare if the equilibrium probability of success is less than 1/2. In other
words, each ﬁrm has an insuﬃcient incentive for increasing the probability of success if
the project is relatively hard to result in a success.
I explain the intuition behind the result. Consider the following situation. The initial
probability of success is 0.1 and it increases up to 0.2 by additional investments. Suppose
that ﬁrm 2 has already failed in the project and its cost is c. Suppose that the cost of
ﬁrm 1 becomes c − ∆ from c. The reduction of the cost increases the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1,
and it also induces the production substitution from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1. Since ﬁrm 1 is
more eﬃcient than ﬁrm 2, this production substitution improve welfare. Since ﬁrm 1
does not fully care about this welfare-improving production substitution eﬀect, ﬁrm 1’s
incentive for investments becomes insuﬃcient. Suppose that ﬁrm 2 has already succeeded
in the project and its cost is c − ∆. Suppose that the cost of ﬁrm 1 becomes c −∆ from
c. The reduction of the cost induces the production substitution from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm
1. Since ﬁrm 2 is eﬃcient whether or not ﬁrm 1’s project is successful, this production
substitution from ﬁrm 2 to ﬁrm 1 is not desirable. Thus, in contrast to the case where
ﬁrm 2 fails, ﬁrm 1’s incentive for investments becomes excessive when ﬁrm 2 succeeds.
In short, given that ﬁrm 2 fails (succeeds), ﬁrm 1’s incentive for investments becomes
insuﬃcient (excessive). Therefore, if equilibrium q2 is low (high), ﬁrm 1’s incentive for
investments becomes insuﬃcient (excessive).
This result makes a sharp contrast with Proposition 1. For example, as is shown in
the proof of Proposition 1, in the ﬁrst game the diﬀerence between marginal social and
marginal private beneﬁts of R&D expenditure is proportional to q(1−q). It is maximized
when q =0 .5. On the other hand, Proposition 2 states that, in the second game social
beneﬁts of R&D expenditure is equal to private one when q =0 .5, so neither taxes nor
subsidies are required in this case. These results imply that the optimal tax-subsidy for
R&D investments crucially depends on what kind of investments ﬁrms practice. Another
example is the welfare eﬀect of R&D subsidies for relatively safe project. For example,
if q =0 .6, subsidies on R&D expenditure improve welfare if they expand the innovation
size, while they are harmful if they raise the probability of success. The desirable policy
crucially depends on the purpose of R&D investment.
65 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I investigate the optimal tax-subsidy policies on R&D investments. I intro-
duce uncertainty into the standard strategic cost-reducing R&D investments. I discuss
two duopoly models. In model 1 (2) an increase in expenditure decreases production
costs when R&D succeeds (probability of failure).
I show that two models yield completely diﬀerent implications for tax-subsidy policies
on R&D investments. In model 1 the equilibrium investment level is always too low from
the viewpoint of social welfare. On the other hand, in model 2 it can be either too low
or too high. I also ﬁnd that risky (safe) investments should be highly subsidized (taxed),
which is never derived in model 1. These results indicate that the optimal tax-subsidy
for R&D investments depends on what kind of investment the ﬁrms practice. In many
countries both direct and indirect subsidies for R&D investments are widely adopted.
This paper indicates that the government should carefully choose what kind of R&D
should be prompted.
In this paper spillover eﬀects of R&D and the associated free-rider problem are ig-
nored. In order to derive richer policy implications, considering spillover eﬀects are
indispensable. Without them, the policy implication becomes limited. This important
extension remains for future research.
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